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Chapter 5 
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Stephen Elstub1 and Annabel Kiernan2 
1University of the West of Scotland 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper considers the extent to which the social open method of coordination 
within the EU can be interpreted as an institutionalisation of the features of deliberative 
democracy at a transnational level. It argues that the experience of the social policy NGO 
sector in policy deliberation inside the EU provides useful illustrations of the difficulties 
of institutionalising such ideals, at transnational level. In spite of the limitations 
experienced thus far, the case offers up a tantalising example of the possible prospects for 
the future by furthering understanding on the barriers to institutionalisation that need to 
be overcome, and on where the trade-offs between theory and practice need to be made at 
a transnational level. More specifically the paper argues that it is the creation of open and 
transparent, weak and strong public spheres that must be achieved, if deliberative 
democracy is to be approximated at any level of governance. The OMC, which is a 
promising element of the ‘Lisbon’ strategy that aims to increase stakeholder participation 
in EU social policy formation, goes some way to achieving this, as it generates dispered 
and ditributed ‘hybrid’ public spheres that are formed through deliberation between the 
NGO sector, national governments, and EU institutional actors. The process is far from 
perfect and particularly needs to be more inclusive (especially in terms of marginal 
groups with challenging views), has been less responsive to the input of stakeholders than 
was hoped and, overall, still remains excessively elite dominated. However the 
commitment to improving on the dynamic between EU institutions and key stakeholders 
in social dialogue remains and the OMC offers a formal gauge of whether such 
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commitments are being met. Ultimately the current OMC fails to approximate 
deliberative democracy sufficiently closely yet, but has had a certain degree of success, 
and therefore promises encouraging prospects for how this could be achieved at 
transnational level in the future. 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the greatest failings of the EU is its democratic deficit. However, for Bohman this 
is better characterised as a ‘deliberation deficit’ (Bohman, 2007, p. 145). The normative 
promise of deliberative democracy is increasingly making it the standard on which to judge 
‘good’ and ‘legitimate’ governance, at every level of governance, including transnational 
governance (Bader and Bartlett, 2005; Dryzek, 2006; Bohman, 2007). However, 
institutionalising deliberative democracy at any level is extremely difficult due to the complex 
nature of modern societies (Femia, 1996; Elstub, 2007). These features of complexity are at 
their most acute at the transnational level. Providing more power to the European Parliament 
is welcome, but not sufficient, ‘rather, more direct forms public deliberation must emerge 
within the polyarchy’ (Bohman, 2007, p. 147). However, through the Lisbon treaty, the EU is 
aiming to address this deficit. For example the European Union’s (EU) social policy 
trajectory represents an attempt to give firm foundation to its claims to being a citizen 
focused, representative, inclusive model of democratic governance. Recent commitments to 
meet the ‘good governance’ agenda, through the development of mechanisms such as the 
Open Method of Coordination (OMC), potentially provide a framework within which some of 
the ideals of deliberative democracy can be approximated (Bohman, 2007). The argument 
forwarded here is that the experience of the social policy Non Governmental Organisation 
(NGO) sector in policy deliberation, inside the EU, provides useful illustrations of the 
potential benefits of creating formal mechanisms which enable stakeholder participation 
which can provide the foundations and the tools for building truly participatory policy forums 
for modern, complex, and transnational societies. Ultimately we argue that the OMC has 
achieved only limited success in approximating the norms of deliberative democracy at 
transnational level. However, despite its limitations the social OMC has enabled innovation in 
consultative processes and, significantly, the engagement by the NGO sector, and other 
stakeholders, in the formal processes has better equipped those actors for utilising the OMC 
structures in the future. Therefore, the operation of the first round of consultations in the 
social OMC may provide an important template on which to build in order to take some 
further, concrete, steps towards embracing the deliberative model of democracy in a trans-
national context. In this sense, rather than providing a firm model for the approximation of 
deliberative democracy at transnational level, the OMC indicates that the EU does have 
prospects for democratisation and the approximation of deliberative democracy. 
Specifically it is argued that the creation of open and transparent, weak and strong public 
spheres, that incorporates degrees of micro and macro deliberation is essential, if deliberative 
democracy is to be approximated at any level of governance. The OMC goes some way to 
achieving this, as it generates dispersed and distributed ‘hybrid’ public spheres that are 
formed through relatively inclusive deliberation between the NGO sector, national 
governments, and EU institutional actors fostering public reason, which is connected to 
decision-making arenas. The process is far from perfect and particularly needs to be more 
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inclusive (especially in terms of marginal groups with challenging views), more transparent, 
has been less responsive to the input of stakeholders than was hoped and, overall, still 
remains excessively elite dominated. However the commitment to improving on the dynamic 
between EU institutions and key stakeholders in social dialogue remains and the OMC offers 
a formal gauge of whether such commitments are being met. Therefore, the current OMC 
does not approximate deliberative democracy sufficiently closely yet, but points the way of 
how this could be achieved at transnational level. 
The chapter is organised into five sections. The first defines deliberative democracy and 
discusses the need for weak and strong deliberative public spheres to institutionalise it. 
Section two explains the key features of the OMC, while section three discusses how the 
OMC creates hybrid public spheres at the transnational level, which point the way to 
approximating deliberative democracy in practice. The benefits of the social OMC, 
particularly in the UK, are highlighted in section four, before section five highlights the 
failings of the process, and outlines potential improvements. 
TRANSNATIONAL DELIBERATIVE  
DEMOCRACY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
There are two key elements of deliberative democracy; ‘democracy’ and ‘deliberation.’ 
The democratic part is collective decision-making through the participation of all relevant 
actors. The deliberative strand is the making of the decisions through the give-and-take of 
rational arguments (Elster, 1998, p. 8). Deliberative democrats believe that through 
deliberative interaction and communication, and therefore the consideration of those with 
differing preferences, existing preferences can be transformed and new preferences formed. 
In fact this preference transformation is thought to be the defining mark of deliberative 
democracy (Elster, 1998, p. 6). Therefore in order for deliberation to have taken place, 
communication between participants must induce ‘reflection upon preferences in a non-
coercive fashion’. This deliberation is democratic if these reflective preferences influence 
collective decisions and all have had an opportunity to participate equally (Dryzek, 2000, p. 
2; Elstub, 2006). It is further thought that these preferences will become more rational and 
public after ‘running the gauntlet’ of collective debate with participants taking on the 
considerations of others (Barber, 1984). Following these core beliefs, deliberative democracy 
has received a number of normative justifications. Included is the prudential justification 
which suggests that deliberative democracy enables preferences of the participants to become 
more autonomous by overcoming inequalities in information and rationality (Elstub, 2006; 
Festenstein , 2002, p. 103). There is also the epistemic justification which suggests, that 
deliberative democracy, by generating pubic reason, is the decision-making method most 
likely to lead to decisions that are true, well justified or commensurate with justice, needs or 
the common good (Bohman, 1998, p. 403; Festenstein, 2002, p. 99; Warren, 2002, p. 192; 
Elstub, 2006). A further justification is that deliberative democracy produces just decisions, 
as it represents a set of fair procedures in which all have been able to participate equally in 
debate, which encourages participants to consider the preferences of others (Elstub, 2006; 
Festenstein, 2002, pp.102-103; Warren, 2002, p. 193). 
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It is these normative ideals which makes deliberative democracy increasingly the 
standard of good and legitimate governance at all levels of governance. Nonetheless features 
of complexity, namely scale, number, dispersion, diversity and inequality of citizens, and the 
need for expertise are significant barriers to achieving deliberative democracy and are all 
accentuated by a further feature of complexity, globalisation (Femia, 1996; Elstub, 2007), 
which itself creates the need for transnational democratic processes (Bader and Bartlett, 2005; 
Dryzek, 2006; Bohman, 2007). 
In order for the theory of deliberative democracy to be approximated in practice at any 
level of governance, and for these normative goals to be generated, there must be public 
debate between participants that leads to decision-making. This public debate element is 
present in public spheres; ‘the space in which citizens deliberate about their common affairs, 
and hence an institutionalised arena of discursive interaction’ (Fraser, 1992, p. 110), that 
combines face-to-face and mediated communication (Bohman, 2007, p. 79). Public spheres 
are secured by rights of freedom of speech and assembly and are potentially open to the 
participation of all (Eriksen, 2000). Public spheres must meet three criteria. There needs to be 
a social space for communication, which must ‘manifest the commitment of participants to 
freedom and equality’, and address an indefinite audience, but with an expected response 
(Bohman, 2007, p. 60). The resulting flows of communication can influence the opinions of 
the public and state sector actors and will be more likely to be based upon reason and be 
publicly orientated as, in order to convince others of the validity of their concerns and 
preferences, participants must be able to ‘employ and appeal to norms of publicity’, limiting 
their potential to act as strategic actors (Habermas, 1996, p. 364). As Bohman argues ‘at the 
very least such public deliberation can add to, and change, the pool of reasons available to 
deliberation’ (Bohman, 2007, p. 61). These public spheres can appear at local, national, 
transnational, international or functional level, making them vital to democracy in the global 
era, as institutions and modes of governance and debate increasingly occur at these 
multilevels. They also help overcome the scale problem as the public sphere transcends 
elements of time and space, potentially enabling all to participate in an anonymous discourse 
(Elstub, 2007). 
Currently throughout the EU’s dominant closed committee system, there is a lack of 
public processes, so interest groups have great leeway to assert private interests and 
manoeuvre themselves to gain vested state powers through funding political parties, lobbying 
and private consultation that leads to the subversion of the formal representative institutions. 
When bargaining with EU and national government officials, they can use sanctions and 
rewards to apply pressure. However, inside public spheres the effect of interest groups is 
limited due to the ‘public’ nature of these processes and these private techniques become 
increasingly ineffectual as convincing reasons become increasingly influential at transforming 
preferences and mobilising public opinion. Not only then is public opinion generated through 
discourse in public spheres, these opinions are also more likely to be based upon reason and 
be publicly orientated; essential aspects of deliberative democracy (Elstub, 2008). 
There are two broad types of public sphere, which reflect two types of deliberation: 
informal public spheres involve participation in opinion formation, where a dialogue is 
conducted across space and time, potentially involving a huge array of civil society actors. 
Here we find macro deliberative democracy which involves informal and unstructured, and 
spontaneous discursive communication, aimed at opinion formation, between partisan 
deliberators and occurs across space and time, within civil society, outside and often against 
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the formal decision-making institutions of the state (Hendriks, 2006). This role of civil 
society associations, like NGOs, as communicators in the informal public sphere is an 
intrinsic one, as they are established through communication between individuals themselves 
and because they must try to influence the preferences of the general public and members of 
other associations by representing and voicing the views and interests of their members to 
gain influence (Elstub, 2007; Habermas, 1996, p. 369; Warren, 2001, pp. 78-80). In contrast, 
formal public spheres are characterised by discussion within institutionalised and decision-
making processes, which generates micro deliberative democracy, which are more likely to 
resemble ideal deliberative procedures, occur within small-scale structured arenas within the 
state, be orientated to decision-making, and include impartial participants deliberating 
together in one place and at one time (Hendriks, 2006). Here we see the relevance of Fraser’s 
distinction between weak and strong public spheres, with strong publics having a decision-
making role, and weak publics involved in opinion formation (Fraser, 1992). Formal public 
spheres, and micro deliberation, tend to be too elitist, but strong as they result in binding 
decisions, laws and policy, but exclude too many participants. The informal public spheres, 
with macro deliberation, are more open, but there is a failure to sufficiently empower citizens 
and make their participation effective in terms of influencing decision-making, meaning such 
public spheres are weak. Consequently, if deliberative democracy is to be effectively 
approximated in the EU, and both the deliberative and democratic elements are to be 
combined, informal public spheres and its macro deliberative communication must be linked 
to formal public spheres and decision-making and micro deliberative venues (Hendriks, 2006; 
Elstub, 2008). 
Achieving the mediated communication required to form a public sphere at transnational 
level is extremely challenging given the intensification of the features of complexity at this 
level, and for Bohman new institutions are required to contribute to this mediation, as the 
same methods used at the level of the nation-state will be inadequate (Bohman, 2007, p. 79). 
He argues that at the transnational level public spheres contribute to democracy by forming 
distributed, but communicative networks that interact with dispersed institutions (Bohman, 
2007, p. 61). For Dryzek the best mechanism of creating a transnational public sphere that can 
approximate the norms of deliberative democracy is the informal networks of communication 
and association of NGOs that form around and counter ‘international regimes’ (Dryzek, 
2006). Such counter-publics are then weak, informal, and at best foster macro, but not micro 
deliberation. Bohman is critical of this approach for these very reasons, suggesting Dryzek’s 
transnational public spheres can only be ‘contestatory’: ‘Dryzek thus ends up with a kind of 
institutional minimalism that also omits the dimension of active and empowered citizenship’ 
(Bohman, 2007, p. 43). Although already established transnational and formal decision-
making institutions, such as the United Nations, World Trade Organisation, and the EU, are 
included in Dryzek’s theory, there is an insufficient link between the deliberation in the weak 
and informal public sphere that the NGOs generate and these strong and formal decision-
making institutions. Nor are these institutions democratic or deliberative themselves. 
Therefore micro and macro deliberation are not linked in this approach. Dryzek is right to see 
the need for transnational public spheres to be embedded in a larger institutional context. As 
Bohman argues this embeddedness is required to ‘secure the conditions of publicity’, and to 
promote the interaction that will generate deliberation (Bohman, 2007, p. 81). The argument 
here is that, in line with Bohman, they need to be embedded more than Dryzek suggests. 
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However, the OMC, part of the social policy dialogue in the EU, points the way to how this 
balance can be achieved. The next section outlines its key features, context, and background. 
SOCIAL POLICY DIALOGUE IN THE EU &  
THE OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION 
The nature of the policy tools and governance mechanisms, which the EU develops, are 
consequential for the development of democracy in the European Union. If a transparent, 
accessible, and a participatory social dimension can be created the public perception of the 
value of the EU can be transformed and thus give substance to the EU’s articulation of its 
democracy, legitimacy and good governance agendas, as well as moving the EU towards the 
incorporation of the norms of deliberative democracy. 
At the Lisbon European Council meeting, in March 2000, the EU took a clear step 
forward in developing these themes in more meaningful ways, which was reflected in the 
formal commitments to a ‘good governance’ agenda and the recognition of the need to 
‘mainstream’ the Union’s social cohesion objectives (embed the social in all other relevant 
policy). The Lisbon Council effectively enabled the continuing development of new forms of 
more participatory, accessible and responsive governance and underlined its commitment to 
recognising ‘the social’ as a distinct field of important policy activity approximating a 
participatory, multi-level governance policy space (Tsakatika, 2004). Specifically, the policy 
tools elaborated through the Lisbon strategy hold clear potential to be an influential model of 
deliberative democracy at the transnational level (Bohman, 2007). It is argued that the social 
dimension of the EU points the way for the delivery of a substantive approximation of 
deliberative democracy, through the elaboration of the OMC for social inclusion, which 
establishes a model for social dialogue enabling formal mechanisms for advancing ‘the 
mobilisation of all actors’ and thus the direct input of the voice of those with direct 
experience of poverty and social exclusion. In fact one of the principal aims of the OMC was 
to increase levels of transparency and participation in decision-making (Lisbon European 
Council 2000 Presidency Conclusions [100/1/00], p. 7). 
The OMC, “involves establishing policy guidelines, setting benchmarks, concrete targets 
and a monitoring system to evaluate progress through peer-review” (De la Porte & Pochet, 
2002, p. 346). The OMC sets guidelines for the Union combined with specific timetables for 
achieving the goals set. As a means of promoting best practice it establishes common 
quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks. There is periodic monitoring, 
evaluation and peer review, organised as exchange of experience and mutual learning (De La 
Porte, Pochet and Room, 2001, p. 293). Crucially, rather than ‘hard law’, the OMC is a ‘soft’ 
process of coordination. It involves agreeing common objectives, developing common 
indicators to measure progress, developing national plans, establishing Community action 
programmes and preparing European reports on the processes and the challenges (Tsakatika, 
2004, p. 91). The OMC includes a transnational exchange programme, which has recently 
undergone reform. Additionally, there is a programme of inter-governmental ‘peer review’ of 
good practice (in which a limited number of NGOs can participate). The OMC process also 
includes innovative developments such as the now annual ‘people experiencing poverty’ 
conference organised under the relevant Presidency of the EU with secretariat provided by the 
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European Anti Poverty Network and a sister NGO, ATD Fourth World. There is an annual 
‘round table’ of all actors also organised by the Presidency. 
Importantly it may be possible to argue that the requirements of deliberative democracy 
(deliberation, the appeal to technical expertise, addressing issues of an inequality of skills, 
creating a consensus and a genuine public space) can be met within the new governance tools 
developed at Lisbon. In particular the OMC lends itself to the creation of national modes of 
consultation which should be formative in the Commission’s and Council’s policy 
development stage. Despite the stakeholder consultations for the OMC being devolved to the 
member state level through the development of separate National Action Plans (NAPs), the 
national consultations feed in to a pan-European policy strategy (producing a Joint Report 
from the Commission) based on cross-national peer-review and policy-learning. Although the 
extent of success of these frameworks thus far is a mixed picture the established consultations 
within member states do have value in their own right, (in terms of creating public space for 
deliberation and delivering a level of expertise), but also in the way their combined pressure 
has produced results at the EU institutional level. This means that despite a slightly rocky 
start, the positives that can be drawn from the experience of these policy tools at this point, 
allow us to be optimistic about their continued utility and their potential to provide a clear 
template for more explicit attempts at a deliberative democracy type mode of governance 
within the EU. 
In line with the timing of the National Reform Programmes (strategic objectives around 
broad economic policy guidelines) Member states will then produce three year Plans to 2011. 
A social inclusion strategy was developed around a set of four objectives on the fight against 
poverty (access to resources, rights, goods, services and employment, preventing poverty 
risks, addressing situations of poverty and mobilising all actors including NGOs). The 
National Action Plans on Social Inclusion (NAPSI), produced by Member States, are the core 
mechanism for addressing the objectives. The European Commission prepares a Joint Report 
assessing the Plans, which is then adopted by the Spring European Council. 
The OMC process then implies a form of ‘policy learning’ by policy actors in the 
national and European context, whilst maintaining some flexibility in the national routes to 
achieving the Lisbon goals. Specifically, the ‘policy learning’ should be achieved through the 
reporting mechanism of NAPSI which report every two years. The conclusions of the Lisbon 
Council stipulate that the new OMC process is a means of spreading best practice and of 
achieving greater convergence of different member states and sectors. The structure and 
operation of NAPSI in particular, as part of the OMC mechanism, offers some potential for a 
genuinely consultative and deliberative policy-making process. NAPSI gave a specific role to 
stakeholder consultation and participation, which was a mechanism for reflecting the broader 
commitment to the ‘mobilisation of all actors’. This attempted institutionalisation of 
consultation is potentially very important for both the development of the social policy 
trajectory but also for establishing a possible model of deliberative democracy in a 
transnational context. The ‘mobilisation of all actors’ strategy is a response to the need for 
stakeholders in the social field to have some direct input into policymaking. In particular it is 
increasingly evident inside the EU that closing the democratic gap is urgent if the EU is to 
retain legitimacy in the face of falling voter turnout at European elections. Also the EU, by its 
very nature, has a need and a capacity for transnational alliance building. This is particularly 
the case in policy areas which require advocacy to achieve maximal, rather than minimal, 
policy responses. These tend similarly to be those areas where there is effectively a 
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requirement for consultation with affected publics or their advocates, in order to make 
meaningful claims to democracy, legitimacy, and responsiveness. Consequently, in the social 
field, the direct insertion of the voice of those with experience of poverty, for example, is 
essential. In line with this, deliberative democracy aims to include all preferences and 
experiences in public dialogue. The next section will consider the relationship between the 
OMC and deliberative democracy in detail. 
THE SOCIAL OMC AS A TEMPLATE FOR TRANSNATIONAL 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
The OMC, as a broad policy tool, has been equated with deliberative democracy (De la 
Porte and Nanz, 2004; Bohman, 2007) and been described as a decentralised, bottom-up 
process of public deliberation that resembles what Cohen and Sabel term ‘directly 
deliberative polyarchy’, where policy debates in local settings occur; meaning normal citizens 
are not disenfranchised from the process completely (Cohen and Sabel, 1997). The EU social 
OMC, might not be a ‘full’ or close approximation of deliberative democracy at transnational 
level yet, but the argument, here, is that it points to the direction transnational, and 
consequently EU institutions and policy processes must move towards to achieve this. 
Currently, the EU is limited in its generation of open inclusion and transparent public spheres 
as the OMC is only one aspect of decision-making institutions within the EU as a whole, and 
elsewhere public processes are easily avoided. 
Bohman (2007, pp. 44-5) argues that the OMC facilitates interactions, communication 
and the exchange of information between institutions and publics by fostering dispersed, 
collaborative, and empowered decision-making processes. Although Bohman acknowledges 
that the OMC could and should be more democratic, he praises it for ultimately being 
deliberative and reflexive, enabling EU citizens to deliberate at these dispersed locations ‘so 
that solutions to problems generated by other deliberators can provide alternatives or can be 
used as premises for the deliberation of others’ (Bohman, 2007, p. 85). In the OMC 
deliberation therefore occurs at a variety of levels, amongst different actors, where local and 
contextual information, reasons and experiences can be shared, and yet still reflected on at 
higher levels, which also enables collective learning (Bohman, 2007, p. 85). Bohman’s 
influential, and normative work, is an excellent starting point to discuss the relationship 
between the OMC and transnational deliberative democracy. However, there is still more that 
can be said about the OMC and its relationship to transnational, and deliberative, public 
spheres. 
In terms of informal public spheres in the EU, their absence has been one of the causes of 
the EU’s democratic deficit. The key rights of freedom of speech and assembly were in place, 
but other factors which provide fertile ground for the development of informal public spheres 
were not present. For example there is an insufficient collective identity, an unsubstantial 
European media, no genuine European political parties and no common first language 
(Schlesinger and Kevin, 2000). Where informal public spheres had managed to emerge in the 
EU they had not been particularly deliberative (Blichner, 2000, p. 148). With its broad 
institutional mix and plurality of decision-making arenas, the EU potentially has many formal 
public spheres. However, most of these arenas are not deliberative in character, are 
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insufficiently public and transparent, are infiltrated by private or national interests groups, are 
elitist and dominated by experts and bureaucrats and, consequently, there is little preference 
change. 
By bringing together many NGOs, national government actors, and EU representatives to 
discuss common social policy affairs in ‘institutionalised discursive action’ the OMC is 
helping to change this by creating European, transnational public spheres; firstly through the 
NAPs at national level and then across transnational borders at the broader level of pan-
European policy strategy (Tsakatika, 2004, p. 93). These NGOs therefore form multiple 
crisscrossing networks of communication, which contribute to opinion formation at national 
and transnational level (Eriksen, 2000, p. 62). In particular mechanisms and frameworks for 
civic dialogue have been developed through the process for the Community and National 
Action Plans, which enable channels of access at the national level that were not previously 
available (of which the ‘Get Heard’ programme in the UK is an excellent example); as well 
as offering increasing opportunities for transnational dialogue and sharing of best practice 
through formal mechanisms like joint reports, conferences and roundtables, which in turn 
have bread continuous, and less formal modes of public communication and networks, which 
include a range of organisations, that resemble informal public spheres. However, there are 
significant differences in national approaches, which mean that not all are as inclusive, public 
or transparent as each other. 
In addition it is necessary for the formal, and informal, public spheres to be linked and 
therefore for the macro deliberation and opinion formation generated in the informal public 
spheres to be connected to EU decision-making through the formal public spheres where 
micro deliberation is developed. The OMC does help achieve this link as it resembles what 
Blichner (2000) describes as a ‘hybrid’ public sphere, not quite as weak as informal public 
spheres isolated in civil society, nor as strong as governmental formal public spheres, as it has 
no formal legislative authority, meaning they are not strong publics as they are not decision-
making arenas themselves (Blichner, 2000, p. 150), producing soft policy decisions instead. 
However, the OMC’s public spheres are not completely disenfranchised from decision-
making arenas due to their close links to national and EU representatives. Perhaps the 
decision-making aspect of deliberative democracy is therefore not fully incorporated in the 
OMC and, as mentioned above, the national government’s submissions to the Commission 
have not always reflected the NGOs’ input. However, the evidence from social policy 
suggests that the decisions made by the formal EU institutions can still be, and in fact has 
been, influenced by the discourses emerging from the national and transnational public 
spheres (Dryzek, 2000, p. 132). Hybrid public spheres may then be the most effective way of 
approximating deliberative democracy, and combining public opinion formation, with 
decision-making, at transnational level, by ensuring that the dispersed public spheres are 
embedded in a larger institutional context, through distributed institutions as Bohman (2007) 
requires. In this sense the hybrid nature of the OMC avoids the weaknesses Bohman 
identified in Dryzek’s approach to transnational deliberative democracy. 
Dryzek argues that NGOs should only deliberate in weak, informal, counter-publics, as 
he fears they will be co-opted if they are included in strong, decision-making publics. 
Consequently, Dryzek sees all projects that attempt to include civil society organisations in 
formal policy making processes as exclusive and unable to challenge inequalities, with these 
actors only ever achieving symbolic inclusion (Dryzek, 2000, p. 85). Furthermore, he 
suggests that having groups excluded from legislative bodies such as the EU aids democracy, 
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as when NGOs remain excluded they are forced to engage in public protest; meaning they can 
provide a more potent threat to legislative bodies than if included. According to Dryzek, EU 
and national government policy is never completely undetermined as imperatives of 
accumulation and legitimation, must be fulfilled. Due to this Dryzek believes entry of NGOs 
will only occur, when the EU/ national government recognises the interest of the group as a 
challenge to its legitimacy or when their interest is directly related to EU/ national 
government imperatives, but not because it recognises the interest as legitimate in its own 
right. Consequently, the group is incorporated if and only if the EU/ national government is 
pursuing a certain public policy that overlaps with the claims of the NGO. In this sense there 
is not a significant transfer of power to the NGOs through processes like the OMC, and, due 
to the inclusion, the NGO no longer remains as a challenge to the EU’s, or relevant national 
government’s, legitimacy in the informal public sphere, leading to ‘the erosion of some 
existing democratic accomplishments, and a reduced likelihood of further democratisation in 
future’ (Dryzek, 2000, pp. 87-8). 
However, the innovation of the Lisbon’s strategy’s social OMC is the development of 
hybrid public spheres at transnational level as soft policy processes, meaning that the NGOs 
that have participated in the NAPs and OMC gain influence and not decision-making power 
per se. Consequently, the NGOs are still in a good position to challenge EU decisions and 
might even be in a better position to do so, having been involved in the OMC and received 
more information throughout this process than they would otherwise have had access to. It is 
also worth noting the relative success of the UK NAPSI in terms of providing real leverage 
for the NGO sector in direct negotiations with government, notably the Treasury and the 
Department of Work and Pensions. 
In addition there does seem to be more scope for NGOs being included into the EU social 
policy process than Dryzek gives credit for. The state imperatives of legitimation and 
accumulation, although restricting, are very broad and leave plenty of scope and plenty of 
alternatives for EU social policy, particularly as these imperatives can be in conflict meaning 
trade-offs need to be made. Consequently, civil society could play a relevant role in deciding 
where the trade-offs between these imperatives should be made, even if it is inevitably 
constrained from abandoning one altogether (Elstub, 2008). Moreover, if these NGOs were 
not included at all in relation to decision-making in the OMC their influence on final 
decisions would be reduced. Once again, because the OMC generates hybrid public spheres, 
neither completely weak, nor strong, it enables the NGOs to influence EU social policy 
legislation, while still remaining in civil society where it can counter-act the EU and 
contribute to critical discourses. 
As discussed above the inclusion of NGOs in a transnational public sphere was thought 
essential by Dryzek (2006) and Bohman (2007) if the norms of deliberative democracy were 
to be approximated at a transnational level. The fact that the social policy OMC’s hybrid 
public spheres are formed through the inclusion of NGO facilitates the approximation of 
deliberative democracy in a number of ways. A key aspect of deliberative democracy is that it 
aims to equally include all voices and opinions in debate. The OMC helps broaden 
democratic deliberation, through these hybrid public spheres, between the NGO sector and 
therefore helps move towards this goal. NGOs are increasingly diverse in terms of 
geographical location, organisational type, membership, identity, size and aims which makes 
them incredibly important to achieving pluralism and to representing a wide variety of 
preferences and beliefs in deliberative communication within the hybrid public spheres of the 
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OMC. The more and the broader the range of NGOs the OMC can include, the more it will 
represent the plural nature of the EU and the closer the approximation of the ideal of 
deliberative democracy it will be. NGOs represent interests that are not territorially based 
which would go un(der)-represented through party politics and, therefore, can overcome the 
restrictions, limitations and inequalities of territorial representation. Therefore, these NGOs 
provide an excellent vessel for plural representation at transnational level. Although, NGOs 
also enable dominant groups to voice their concerns, the OMC, by incorporating NGOs, 
brings in new speakers to public debate, which then changes the parameters of debate. NGOs 
therefore enable those with similar beliefs, preferences and needs to combine their voice and 
therefore increase the chance that they will be heard (Elstub, 2007). This means that the EU 
social policy process becomes more deliberatively democratic as it includes the preferences of 
a broader range of citizens and not just those from dominant groups, technical experts and 
political elites. 
One of the main reasons why the EU has a democratic deficit is that it gives experts a 
privileged position in decision-making through its complex committee system. This has led to 
‘steering without democracy and governance without government’ (Eriksen and Fossum, 
2000, p. 14) as mechanisms that link the opinions of experts with the preferences of the 
affected citizens are absent (De la Porte and Nanz, 2004, p. 271). The EU committee system, 
therefore, needs increased levels of participation and deliberation to gain legitimacy (Vos, 
1999, p. 31). This is why the OMC, and Lisbon strategy as a whole, are promising processes, 
as they attempt to combine expertise from a range of sources, by incorporating a diversity of 
NGOs, making the process more democratic. NGOs are particularly useful at forming and 
organising information due to the fact that they specialise in certain areas which are of 
particular relevance to their members which they then represent to other citizens, to the state 
and transnational institutions like the EU. Furthermore, NGOs create a division of labour in 
the collection and organisation of information, achieving economies of scale that enable 
citizens to acquire levels of information that they would be unable to obtain by themselves 
(Cohen and Rogers, 1995, pp. 42-3; Hirst, 1994, pp. 34-40; Warren, 2001, pp. 71-2; Elstub 
2007). Indeed a case may be made for the social policy NGO sector and the associated 
stakeholders to be understood as an epistemic community in their own right. In addition, due 
to their close involvement with their members, NGOs can provide information that would 
otherwise be unavailable to the distant EU committees (Cohen and Rogers, 1995, p. 43). All 
this information helps NGOs hold the EU officials, bureaucrats, and institutions accountable. 
Moreover, the more public the OMC process, the more likely preferences will be based on 
public reasons, which is not the case with specialists operating in private committees. 
Fraser argues that socio-economic inequalities cause the cultural ethos developed by 
socio-economic groups to be unequally valued. She further suggests that in everyday life, and 
within the public sphere, such powers are magnified because inequality in the political 
economy affects opportunities for access to participation, meaning public spheres are not and 
cannot be neutral and equally ‘expressive of any and every cultural ethos’ (Fraser, 1992, p. 
120). This inequality severely limits a public sphere’s potential to fulfil both deliberative and 
democratic roles. The OMC helps with this problem, to some degree, by helping to form 
multiple public spheres around a variety of social policy issues and at various levels of 
governance, due to its dispersed and distributed transnational, and multilevel mechanisms. 
Multiple public spheres provide subordinate groups with the arenas to deliberate and form 
collective preferences, goals, strategies and identities away from the unequal influence of 
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dominant groups (Fraser, 1992, p. 123). Nevertheless, they aim to disseminate their beliefs 
and communicate these to as broad a public as possible through networks with associations 
and between public spheres, which is the key criteria that makes them a public (Fraser, 1992, 
p. 124). 
There are, however, considerable weaknesses with the OMC process and essential 
improvements that need to be made, if the promise to approximate deliberative democracy at 
a transnational level is to be achieved. However, before considering the failings of the social 
OMC, the chapter will turn to the benefits that have emerged from the process, especially in 
the UK. 
HARNESSING THE BENEFITS OF THE  
SOCIAL POLICY OMC PROCESS 
In terms of the measurable impact of these policy tools, there has been a range of 
experiences across the member states. However, for the OMC and the NAPSI in the UK for 
example, the national NGO sector has made significant use of the channels available through 
the OMC, and thus demonstrates what is possible to achieve if the NGO sector and other 
stakeholders maximise the potential of these formally instituted processes. In more general 
terms, creating policy discussion and interaction space between national government officials, 
the NGO/charitable sector in the social policy field, as well as formal EU institutional 
involvement through the Commission’s Joint Report, the social OMC has been a (qualified) 
success. In addition, the leverage it has allowed NGOs, in their relationship with the member 
state governments, has, in some member states – notably the UK – also been significant. That 
is, in some member states the point of pressure for social policy development has shifted from 
applying pressure for at least minimal convergence on national governments via the EU to 
maintaining pressure on the EU to develop measures to protect the European Social Model 
(ESM) via national governments. In other words the national policy space has become, in 
some member states, the more important location for action to expand EU competency in the 
field. This is interesting for two reasons: firstly in terms of the implications it has for 
subsidiarity and EU integration and policy convergence; and secondly, as noted by de la 
Porte, Pochet & Room (2001, p. 298), the pressure for convergence is coming, not from 
centralised and imposed European frameworks but from the pressure to improve (be least 
worst) arising from the peer review, policy learning dynamic of the OMC process. 
‘The soft processes involved in OMC, emphasising transparency, accountability and 
effectiveness, would seem to have an obvious relevance to principles of good governance. 
OMC also seems well attuned to the currently fashionable debates on ‘multi-level 
governance’, with the actions of independent public actors at different levels articulated with 
each other to reach shared objectives’ (De la Porte, Pochet and Room, 2001, p. 300)  
In addition the OMC has encouraged very positive policy consultation processes. Again 
looking at the example of the UK, the NAPSI required the ‘feeding in’ of expertise to 
government through broad consultation with stakeholders. Consequently the UK unit of the 
European Anti Poverty Network launched a consultation, “Get Heard”, which held open 
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forums with 47 social and community groups in order to define targets and shape priorities in 
the UK NAPSI (see Cochrane, 2006). This was a very successful consultation in two key 
ways: Firstly it established a functioning network of stakeholders and representatives of the 
NGO sector which can provide a reservoir of expertise on the issues surrounding social 
inclusion both now and in the future. This has helped enhance the profile of the NGO/social 
policy lobby sector in terms of its relations with government, because it is accessing national 
government departments through the legitimacy of the stakeholder/good governance agenda 
established by the EU. Secondly, and of particular importance in terms of deliberative 
democracy which aims at preference change, the Get Heard process held the important 
function of ‘policy learning’. In addition to allowing people access to genuine policy 
consultation, it provided the tools for skills’ development in this area. In a practical sense the 
Get Heard project created a ‘toolkit’ for those groups wanting to participate, which provided 
core information and context as well as methods and frameworks for getting the most out of 
the process. This is of utmost importance for continuing the commitment to the mobilisation 
of all actors and the real establishment of deliberatively democratic processes. To ensure that 
the ‘mobilisation of all actors’ has real meaning it is important to give people the tools to 
allow their voice to be genuinely heard. This should, longer term, allow community groups 
and social actors to take greater ownership of the process of consultation. 
It is also worth noting the relative success of the UK NAPSI in terms of providing real 
leverage for the NGO sector in direct negotiations with government. Although there has been 
a certain amount of (deserved) criticism of the ‘feeding out’ end of the process – that is the 
extent to which the NGO input is reflected in the government’s NAPSI submission to the 
Commission – the sustained pressure and work of the social policy NGO sector in the UK has 
paid off in terms of further and better access to key government departments. There is a clear 
difference here in terms of the experience of the social policy NAP compared to that of the 
Employment and Pensions NAPs (see De la Porte and Nanz, 2004). Although there has been 
pressure to ‘roll up’ all three NAPs into a single reporting mechanism to the Commission, the 
social policy NGO sector successfully argued for a separate NAP in the social field; this is in 
large part founded on the need to retain a distinct social dimension as the third side of the 
Lisbon triangle, rather than to see social inclusion measures integrated into a broad sweep of 
economic, specifically labour market, reforms. As a consequence there has been a different 
experience of the OMC in these fields. There are two clear reasons for these contrasting 
experiences. Firstly the transnational and domestic commitment to maintaining distinct 
measures for combating poverty and promoting social inclusion in the framework of the ESM 
can be seen in the work of network actors, as well as having some advocacy at the level of the 
institutions, notably through Commissioner Spidla (DGV) and in ECOSOC. Secondly the 
responsiveness of the relevant government department has also been a key feature. It has been 
the case that the Department for Work and Pensions (involved in the UK NAPSI) has been 
more open to consultation with lobby network actors than the Department for Trade and 
Industry (involved in the EES NAP) for example. In this way we may be able to start to 
identify something closer to the typical policy community model in the social field than has 
previously been the case in the EU; but one which is enhanced by having harnessed the input 
of a range of actors normally excluded from direct intervention in the policy process and also 
one that is more public and transparent than the private negotiations and bargaining than 
usually occurs in government consultation. 
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Further evidence that the OMC process has ‘paid off’ in the social field lies in the 
conclusions of the Spring European Council, 2006. There was criticism from within the 
Commission, as well as from actors in the broader policy network of the mid-term review of 
Lisbon in 2005. The mid-term review led by the Kok Report seemed to indicate a clear shift 
in priorities away from the three equal sides of the triangle, towards labour market reform 
packages to achieve the goals of the growth and competitiveness agenda. Such a drift in 
priorities clearly unpicked the previously established consensus on the need for separate 
action in the social field to tackle poverty and social inclusion on the basis that (a) there is a 
ESM to be defended by such measures and (b) that economic reform could not tackle all 
social inclusion issues, such as in-work poverty. However, the Spring European Council 2006 
shows some indication of at least a partial ‘rowback’ on the position adopted at the mid-term 
review. Specifically the then Commission President Barroso, in his reflections on the first 
round of Member State NAPSIs, noted the weak consultation in some member states and has 
called for greater stakeholder participation in the future. Taken together then, the initial 
Lisbon strategy is somewhat back on its original path and the credit for rerouting the EU 
institutions on this matter must, for the most part, be attributed to the policy deliberations of 
the network actors in the social policy NGO sector which has had greater impact as a 
consequence of the establishment of the OMC framework. There are then strengths of, and 
benefits provided by, the social OMC, suggesting it is a promising process to enhance 
democracy in the EU. But it is just a promise. Its success is limited. The process has 
significant failings, to which we now turn. 
LIMITS OF THE SOCIAL OMC 
The social OMC was preceded by OMCs in the fields of employment and pensions (de la 
Porte and Nanz, 2004). It is certainly the case that the OMC varies considerably in 
accordance with the policy area (Tsakatika, 2004, p. 96). It seems lessons have been learnt 
from these, and improvements made with respect to democracy and legitimacy, but there are 
still significant failings of the social OMC, with plenty of scope for improvement in the 
future. According to recent research though, in terms of the European Employment Strategy 
(EES) and Pensions OMCs, the key elements of deliberative democracy have been enhanced 
to varying, but limited degrees. For example transparency is still poor (although this has been 
improved since 2003 with an EES website), but it remains one of the key areas advocated for 
improvement (Tsakatika, 2004; de Búrca and Zeitlin, 2003). Public debate is still partial and 
often ignored by the relative national governments. Social participation, although much 
increased (especially at the level of implementation), is still low in relation to the incentives 
offered, due to the lack of a formal role for the NGOs and social participants, and calls are 
made for it to be ‘upgraded’ (Tsakatika, 2004, p. 95; de Búrca and Zeitlin, 2003). It is 
suggested this would be made easier if the process was made more transparent (Tsakatika, 
2004, p. 97). Finally, both processes are being driven by the national governments with the 
process being centralised and top-down. Despite these factors, those who do participate in 
both the EES and pensions OMCs have been willing to alter their preferences, including 
member states, although this feature manifests itself much less when member states see the 
issue as particularly sensitive (de la Porte and Nanz, 2004). Nevertheless, the social policy 
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actors have been more successful at harnessing the OMC process and particularly in terms of 
making the most of the potential to ‘feed in’ from the broader community in to the national 
social strategy in the NAPSI, although there is plenty of evidence of the same problems of an 
elite-led process (specifically in relation to the extent of the ‘feeding out’ from the national 
plans to the Commission Joint Report) as experienced in the in the EES and Pensions OMCs. 
The impact of the Kok Group 2004 and the mid-term review of the Lisbon strategy 2005 
highlighted the fact that the Lisbon strategy can be by-passed by elites as a key constraint for 
the EU’s potential to approximating deliberative democracy. The strategy only suggests the 
deliberations and resulting opinions of the OMC be ‘taken into account’, which means 
democracy is compromised as power is not dispersed and it could lead to NGOs only being 
symbolically included. The public spheres that are generated through the OMC do not 
‘emerge spontaneously’ from civil society but are created by the EU institutions. This 
compromises their ability to form inclusive and oppositional networks (Dryzek, 2000, pp. 
134-5), as a key requirement of informal public spheres is that it they are ‘not prior to or 
independent of decision-making agencies but created and formed in opposition to them- as a 
vehicle to test the legitimacy of legal provisions and as a counterweight to government 
power’ (Eriksen, 2000, p. 55). We must therefore be sceptical as to whether the NGOs 
included in the social policy OMC have real ownership of a process established by 
government to serve government interests. 
The OMC was not formalised in the draft constitution and the strategy could 
consequently be more inclusive (Tsakatika, 2004). There are no specifics about who should 
be included in the debates within the policy process, meaning many affected are not 
represented and therefore remain excluded, which severely compromises deliberation and 
democracy. The problem lies in the absence of incentives for member states to have truly 
inclusive NAPs, except for morality and peer pressure (Zeitlin, 2005). Currently member 
states cannot fail in their NAPs, given the lack of specific targets to meet, which points to the 
need for considerably more stringent requirements of inclusion. 
We see the need for inclusion in the NAPs to be removed from the power of national 
governments who currently exclude from the OMC process the more critical NGOs, and 
therefore, to a degree, frame deliberation and decision-making in the OMC. This both 
undermines democracy, as there are those who are affected by the resulting social policy that 
are excluded, and undermines deliberation as relevant views, information and reasons are not 
heard. Moreover, the groups excluded from the OMC are those who are currently excluded by 
other EU, and national government, decision-making processes. In order to avoid this, the 
OMC processes must be well advertised across a diversity of media so that relevant NGOs are 
aware of the forums. It will also be necessary for the OMC organisers to identify and contact 
key stakeholders, and hopefully, with the establishment of networks between NGOs, 
recruitment will also be aided. A possible solution is to have targets for inclusion in the 
OMCs and targets not be set by the EU or national governments themselves, but perhaps the 
only way to ensure the OMC is not determined by the potential bias of the adversarial EU and 
National government political processes is if participants, in the OMC, are self-selecting 
(Elstub, 2008). 
Bohman also sees weaknesses of the OMC, again indicating that this EU process has not 
as yet successfully approximated transnational deliberative democracy. Firstly the OMC 
process is only semi-public as it is dominated by administrative agencies and private policy 
experts, with insufficient opportunities for citizen participation, who inevitably are in a 
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hierarchical relationship with the officials. To make the OMC more democratic, and enable 
more citizen deliberation Bohman suggests integrating minipublics into the OMC process 
(Bohman, 2007, pp. 87-8). Minipublics are small groups of randomly selected citizens that 
are ‘small enough to be genuinely deliberative and representative enough to be genuinely 
democratic’. These include citizens’ juries, deliberative opinion polls, consensus conferences 
and planning cells (Goodin, 2008, p. 11). For Bohman this would help compensate for the 
self-selection inevitable with the participation of NGOs, due to their use of random sampling, 
and reduce the influence of experts. Bohman also thinks that the internet could play an 
important role in transnational deliberative decision-making processes like the OMC, which 
would extend the public sphere and make it more inclusive (Bohman, 2007, p. 89), and the 
ESS website has helped this but could still be a more deliberative and interactive site. Finally 
the employment of adjudicative and judicial institutions, which enable rights of appeal, and 
therefore enhances accountability, but also contribute to the public sphere by encouraging 
contestation of discourses within civil society, should be included (Bohman, 2007, p. 90). 
CONCLUSION 
The EU suffers from a significant democratic deficit. As the credence of deliberative 
democracy continually grows it increasingly represents the criteria which must be met, by a 
decision-making process, to be considered legitimate. However, due to complexity, 
deliberative democracy is difficult to achieve in practice, and these features of complexity are 
even more significant at a transnational level. The social OMC approximates deliberative 
democracy, to a degree unprecedented at EU level, by generating distributed and dispersed 
hybrid public spheres that generate opinion forming debates, through which citizens can 
participate, that have formal links to policy making arenas, and formal public spheres. 
Consequently, the two essential aspects for the approximation of deliberative democracy are, 
to a degree at least, achieved. Macro deliberation is generated through the informal discursive 
public spheres and micro deliberation through the formal decision-making public sphere. The 
OMC leads to multiple, multilevel, public spheres, which helps to improve access to these 
debates for subordinate groups. The vital participants in these hybrid public spheres are 
NGOs which enable plural representation of expert and lay information, which also helps 
facilitate the approximation of deliberative democracy. 
However, this is not to say that the OMC cannot be improved and the norms of 
deliberative democracy approximated more closely. The argument here is that the Lisbon 
Strategy points to the type of institutional structures that are needed to institutionalise 
deliberative democracy at transnational level and help illuminate where the trade-off between 
theory and practice should be made. There are, however, considerable weaknesses with the 
OMC process and essential improvements that need to be made, if the promise to 
approximate deliberative democracy at a transnational level is to be achieved. The extent of 
the EU’s leadership and various national governments’ commitment to developing genuine 
deliberatively democratic policy processes is in doubt as, to date, the OMCs have only been 
employed in areas where the EU does not have great levels of power. The social OMC itself 
needs to be adapted to make it more deliberative and more democratic, most notably in terms 
of power of decision-making and in the inclusiveness of the process, but the generation of 
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hybrid public spheres is nonetheless an important development in EU democracy and to the 
plausibility of approximating deliberative democracy at transnational level. This is still a long 
way from being an approximation of deliberative democracy, but the social OMC provides an 
important template on which to improve in order to take some further, concrete, steps towards 
embracing the deliberative model of democracy in a transnational context. 
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